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Abstract
Mobile or SMS spam is a real and growing problem primarily due to the
availability of very cheap bulk pre-pay SMS packages and the fact that SMS
engenders higher response rates as it is a trusted and personal service. SMS
spam filtering is a relatively new task which inherits many issues and solu-
tions from email spam filtering. However it poses its own specific challenges.
This paper motivates work on filtering SMS spam and reviews recent devel-
opments in SMS spam filtering. The paper also discusses the issues with
data collection and availability for furthering research in this area, analyses
a large corpus of SMS spam, and provides some initial benchmark results.
Keywords: SMS spam filtering, text classification, SMS spam dataset
1. Introduction
Spam is unsolicited and unwanted messages sent electronically. Email
spam is sent/received over the Internet while SMS spam is typically trans-
mitted over a mobile network. Traditional email spammers are moving to the
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mobile networks as the return from the email channel is diminishing due to
effective filtering, industry collaboration and user awareness. The Short Mes-
saging Service (SMS) mobile communication system is attractive for criminal
gangs for a number of reasons. It is becoming cost effective to target SMS
because of the availability of unlimited pre-pay SMS packages in countries
such as India, Pakistan, China, and increasingly the US. In addition SMS
can result in higher response rates than email spam as SMS is a trusted ser-
vice with subscribers comfortable with using it for confidential information
exchange. According to the GSMA it is inevitable that mobile network op-
erators across the globe will see a rise in the volume and sophistication of
SMS attacks in 2011 (GSMA, 2011b).
SMS spam is an emerging problem in the Middle East and Asia, with
SMS spam contributing to 20-30% of all SMS traffic in China and India
(GSMA, 2011b). As an example of this Chinese mobile subscribers received
200 billion spam messages in one week in 20081. While it is estimated that in
North America the current level of mobile spam is currently only 0.1% of all
messages per person per day (GSMA, 2011a), 44% of mobile device owners
surveyed in the US reported receiving SMS spam2.
Apart from being a nuisance, mobile subscribers can suffer financial loss
from SMS spam. By responding to an SMS spam subscribers can end up call-
ing premium rate numbers or signing up to expensive subscription services.
They can unknowingly access suspect websites and be at risk of phishing
attacks or malware downloads. Mobile network operators are also suffering
financially, experiencing higher network and operating costs and increased
customer care costs in addition to damage to their brand and threat of reg-
ulation.
Current anti-spam measures in place in mobile operator networks include
anti-spoofing and faking measures which can successfully identify SMS mes-
sages that have been manipulated to forge the originating details in order to
avoid charges. With the rise in non spoofed or faked SMS spam messages
the need for more sophisticated filtering techniques is increasing. Simple fil-
tering methods use traffic analysis to identify high volumes of messages from
individual subscribers3. A worrying dynamic is that spammers are using low
1http://www.sophos.com/en-us/press-office/press-releases/2008/03/
china_sms.aspx
2http://www.cloudmark.com/en/resources/mobile-survey/
3http://raiderstyle.com/SMS_SpamFraudPrevention.pdf
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volumes and advanced methods to avoid detection (GSMA, 2011b). They
typically send small quantities of spam messages to observe how the oper-
ator’s SMS infrastructure responds and then determine the volume limits
policies. These directions indicate that content-based filtering is necessary
to counteract the increasing threat of SMS spam.
This paper reviews the current state of the art in SMS spam filtering con-
centrating on the content-based technologies which are becoming more and
more necessary in the battle against SMS spam. The rest of this paper is
structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the similarities and differences be-
tween email and SMS spam filtering. Section 3 discusses the current research
into content-based SMS spam filtering while Section 4 discusses the issues
with collecting SMS data for research into SMS spam filtering and analyses a
large corpus of SMS spam messages. The paper then concludes in Section 5.
2. From email to SMS filtering
The (at least superficial) similarity of SMS spam filtering to email spam
filtering suggests that proven techonologies in email spam filtering may be
useful in combating SMS spam. The content-based technologies used in email
spam filtering that are candidates for SMS spam filtering include both direct
content filtering and collaborative content filtering techniques.
The direct content filtering technologies search or use the direct textual
content of the message and vary from the simplistic keyword filtering to the
more varied SpamAssassin-type rule sets, to the more complex automatic text
classification approaches. Automatic text classification (Sebastiani, 2002)
uses supervised machine learning algorithms to train a model on a set of
examples of spam and legitimate messages which are labelled appropriately.
This set is known as the training set and should be representative of typical
spam and legitimate messages. The model learns from this training set how
to distinguish spam from non spam and is used to predict whether new
messages are spam or not.
Automatic text classification requires a representation of each message,
typically an n-dimensional vector where each dimension represents a charac-
teristic or feature that is predictive of the text classification problem. The
features are identified by parsing and tokenisation of the textual content, a
typical tokenisation being word tokenisation but n-gram character-based or
word-based tokenisations are also popular. The value of each feature in the
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vector representation of a message is normally representative of the frequency
of occurrence of that feature in the message.
Collaborative content filtering techniques allow a group of users to share
information on spam messages. A successful approach is to generate a signa-
ture (sometimes known as a fingerprint) from the content of a known spam
message and this is distributed and shared with a group of users. A signature
is generated for all incoming messages and checked against the known spam
signatures, and matches are labelled as spam messages. A well-known exam-
ple is Vipul’s Razor4, an un-disclosed variation of which is used by the email
spam filtering company Cloudmark5. Collaborative filtering techniques rely
heavily on the quality and amount of user-reporting of spam, which can be
difficult in the mobile world as smart mobile devices and appropriate software
technology are necessary to support user-reporting functionality.
The fact that many of the same issues apply across both filtering do-
mains supports using proven email filtering technologies. Both domains have
the technical issues of efficiency of filtering in real-time and have to decide
between client-side and/or server-side filtering. More significantly, the char-
acteristics of email spam filtering that make it a challenging filtering problem
transfer also to the mobile space. The unequal and uncertain misclassifica-
tion costs, in particular the requirement to exclude false positives (legitimate
SMS messages that are incorrectly classified as spam by the filter) are as ap-
parent in SMS spam filtering as in email spam filtering. In addition the issue
of handling concept drift, the constant change in spam in order to bypass
filters, is also a key challenge. There is already strong evidence of concept
drift in current SMS spam with spammers using low volumes to avoid volume
filters. As SMS spam becomes more prevalent and the filtering becomes more
sophisticated in response, concept drift will become a significant problem in
SMS spam filtering.
For SMS spam however a number of additional issues arise, firstly re-
garding the message itself. The maximum length of an SMS message is 160
characters which means there is little material for content-based filtering.
Due to the short message length available, SMS subscribers use an idiosyn-
cratic language subset with abbreviations, phonetic contractions, bad punc-
tuation, emoticons, etc., which is different to the more traditional written
4http://razor.sourceforge.net/
5http://www.cloudmark.com/
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language more typically used in emails (Kobus et al., 2008; Ling, 2005). It
has also been shown that email spam filtering can be improved by includ-
ing contextual information found in the email headers (Rennie, 2000; Zhang
et al., 2004; Lai, 2007) but SMS messages contain far less information in the
headers, which offers less context to work with.
The mobile technology is also a factor. Client side solutions to spam
filtering must operate on resource-constrained mobile devices. Despite the
increasing use of smartphones, so-called “feature” phones, with only basic
voice call and text functionality are still in the majority, especially in emerg-
ing markets where such phones continue to be launched and sold (Maina,
2010). Such devices also do not have the functionality to display a spam
folder such as is common with email clients, so it is more difficult to tell
users that messages have been blocked. Furthermore, mobile devices typi-
cally do not facilitate user reporting of spam messages, unless this service
is offered by the network or by a third party, e.g. via a shortcode, which
makes collaborative content filters, which rely on user feedback, difficult to
implement.
Recently there has been research into applying the successful email spam
filtering techniques to SMS spam filtering with some success. The next
section will review the developments in SMS spam filtering which tend to
focus on using the more popular supervised learning or text classification
approaches but it will also discuss research into other types of classification
approaches used including frequency analysis and social network analysis.
3. Content based SMS spam filtering
Early work proposing the application of automatic text classification tech-
niques to SMS spam filtering includes work by Xiang et al. (2004) who sug-
gested that Support Vector Machines (SVM) would be appropriate for the
problem but did not evaluate their use, and work by Healy et al. (2005) that
considered using k-NN classifiers. Go´mez Hidalgo et al. (2006) evaluated a
number of classification algorithms on two SMS spam datasets and concluded
that these techniques can be effectively transferred from email to SMS spam
filtering, with SVMs being the most suitable. Work by Cai et al. (2008) on
a Chinese spam dataset used the simpler and lesser used Winnow algorithm
(Littlestone, 1988), a linear classifier that has shown good performance in
high dimensional feature domains with irrelevant features.
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Wu et al. (2008) used a Bayes learner to extract keywords for monitoring
traffic centrally, allowing a spamminess score to be assigned, however this
work was not evaluated. Jie et al. (2010) added a cost function to a Naive
Bayes filter which assigned a high cost to false positives. This translates into
a high spam classification threshold, and a higher threshold results in higher
spam precision. Longzhen et al. (2009) proposed using a k-nearest neigh-
bour algorithm (k-NN) as part of a multi-filtering approach. After black-
and white-listing, a message is first classified by a filter using rough sets,
which provide approximate descriptions of concepts. If this filter classifies
the message as spam, it is then passed to the k-NN classifier for final clas-
sification. An evaluation on a data set of 550 spam SMS and 200 non-spam
SMS with k = 12 showed that this dual filtering method is faster and more
accurate than using k-NN alone.
In other recent work Liu & Wang (2010) proposed a simple index model
which calculates the spaminess score of each SMS message as a function of
the frequency of occurrence of features across the different categories of spam
and non-spam in the training data. Their approach uses inverted indexes for
speed of access and ease of update and they suggested that an ensemble of
these index models, each based on a different feature set derived from the
lexical analysis of the message content and the header information, provides
good filtering performance.
Junaid & Farooq (2011) investigated the use of evolutionary classifiers
for filtering SMS spam. They compare five supervised learning algorithms
with four evolutionary classifiers. Results show comparable performance in
general but the sUpervised Classifier System (UCS), a Michigan style rule-
based learning classifier system, outperformed the others when over 3000 test
messages were presented for filtering. The authors claim that this is due to
the capability of UCS to evolve rules online. A limitation of such evolution-
ary classifiers is the performance at runtime. Junaid & Farooq’s (2011) work
reported that the average time to classify a message using the supervised
learning algorithms is a fraction of a second, while most evolutionary clas-
sifiers require 3 to 4 seconds for classification although UCS is faster at 1.2
seconds.
Most recently Almeida et al. (2011) have reported on a comparison of
a number of supervised learning algorithms to provide baseline results for
each. They use a corpus of 5,574 messages in total which contains 747 spam
and 4,827 non-spam messages. Two methods of tokenisation are tested, a
tokeniser which separates on any character other than alphanumeric and
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certain punctutation characters (comma, dash, dot and colon) and a variation
which also tokenises domain names and mail addresses. The 13 classifiers
used in the experiment include 8 variations of Naive Bayes, a linear SVM, a
Minimum Description Length classifier, k-NN, the decision tree learner C4.5,
and PART, a rule learner. They find that the linear SVM along with the
alphanumeric tokenisation performs best, with an overall accuracy of 97.64%,
a false positive rate of 0.18%, and a recall on the spam class of 83.1%. The
next three top-ranked algorithms, namely boosted NB, boosted C4.5 and
PART, were not significantly worse, each with an overall accuracy of 97.5%.
Hybrid approaches have also been proposed which combine content-based
filtering with challenge-response, a technique which automatically sends a re-
ply to a message sender which requires the sender to perform some action
to ensure delivery of their message, (Yoon et al., 2010; He et al., 2008).
Challenge-response systems have been put forward for email spam filter-
ing but there is considerable anecdotal evidence discrediting them (Graham-
Cumming, 2005)6. Their limitations include increased network traffic, prob-
lems with receiving legitimate messages from valid automated online services
such as mailing lists or online retailers and the fact that they are open to
abuse. Yoon et al.’s (2010) proposal to address some of the limitations was
to use challenge-response for a limited subset of SMS messages where the
content-based classifier is uncertain of the classification. The filter is oper-
ated centrally and they identify a number of protocols of use involving an
image CAPTCHA to ensure delivery. He et al.’s (2008) suggestion was that
an image CAPTCHA should be generated for each message which is neither
centrally black- or white-listed.
Much of the work already discussed offers server-based, centrally focused
solutions to the SMS spam filtering problem. However, there are a number
of researchers who have suggested solutions which are installed on the client
mobile device or that are part of a distributed approach that incorporates
central server processing with client side processing. Deng & Peng (2006)
proposed a distributed spam filtering system using a Naive Bayes classifier on
the client mobile device. User feedback on the client side is needed to confirm
spam classifications and misclassifications and these are reported back to the
SMS processing centre, via a shortcode, where the classifier is retrained and
filter updates are downloaded to the mobile phone. The central processing
6http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386036,00.asp
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also includes traffic analysis of sender information ranking senders based on
their likelihood of sending spam. This likelihood value is calculated for each
sender as a function of the sender’s sending frequency, the consistency of the
interval between sender’s messages and the proportion of receivers to whom
messages are sent by that sender.
Yadav et al.’s (2011) approach is similar to Deng & Peng’s (2006) in that
they propose a client side Naive Bayes filter which uses the occurrence of
keywords that appear in spam messages to determine a spam score. Messages
that score above a certain threshold are labelled as spam. Their solution also
requires user feedback to confirm and correct errors made by the classifier
and therefore their filter can learn new spam keywords from client reports to
a central server, which are in turn pushed out to other clients.
A different client side approach which considered a byte-level representa-
tion of the messages is proposed by Rafique & Farooq (2010). They trained
individual first-order HMMs to model the probabilities of occurrence of par-
ticular byte sequences for both spam and legitimate messages. These proba-
bilities were used to calculate a spam score for an unseen message which was
classified as spam if the score exceeded a specific threshold. Their solution
was deployed at the access control layer of a smart mobile device. The moti-
vation behind this work was to provide a lightweight client-side solution that
was deployable on resource-constrained mobile devices. A potential limita-
tion of this approach is the difficulty in the re-training required to handle
concept drift.
3.1. Feature Engineering in SMS spam
The success of machine learning techniques depends greatly on the se-
lection of an appropriate feature set for the problem in question. There has
been work in feature engineering for mobile spam which attempts to identify
the best features to use in the message representation. A feature set includ-
ing words, normalised (i.e. lowercase) words, character bi- and tri-grams and
word bi-grams suggested by Go´mez Hidalgo et al. (2006) has provided a base
feature set for much of the work in feature engineering. Cormack et al. (2007)
found that a slight variation on this set including orthogonal word bigrams
improved the performance of classification algorithms on SMS spam data.
Sohn et al. (2009) expanded the base feature set by including features based
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on stylometry7 suggested in author attribution studies. The stylistic features
extracted using shallow linguistic analysis included the byte and the average
byte length of messages, function word frequencies, part of speech n-grams
and emoticon and special character frequencies which were extracted using
manually constructed lexicons. These stylistic features, tested on a Korean
SMS spam dataset, were shown to be potentially useful in improving the
performance of a maximum entropy based spam filter, with the length fea-
tures providing most benefit and part of speech features least benefit. There
is some evidence across the existing work on SMS spam filtering that the
length of the message is a strong predictive feature (Deng & Peng, 2006;
Sohn et al., 2009; Liu & Wang, 2010; Yadav et al., 2011) although these
studies typically use single language datasets and as such this result may not
scale across multiple languages.
In their review of machine learning methods for email spam filtering
Guzella & Caminhas (2009) report that bag of words representation is the
most widely used for email spam filtering. They caution that this leads to
a bias in the problem due to the difficulty in updating the feature set to
add new and remove existing words that become less predictive as the con-
cept changes. This problem exists in SMS spam filtering also, however work
by Junaid & Farooq (2011) attempts to get over this problem by using a
representation which includes all possible octet bigram combinations (1521
features in total) in the feature set. They enhance the feature representation
by including the frequency of each character appearing in the message. Due
to encoding schemes used in the GSM standards there are limited character
sets available and this results in an additional 256 characters or features in
their feature set. They report a good performance of this feature set across a
number of supervised and evolutionary learning algorithms although it was
not directly compared with the more typical bag of words representation.
A recognised problem in text classification is the high dimensionality of
the feature space. Most work in SMS spam filtering uses some sort of feature
selection technique to reduce the large feature space, including Information
Gain (Go´mez Hidalgo et al., 2006; Sohn et al., 2009) and Mutual Information
(Deng & Peng, 2006) which are widely accepted methods in text classifica-
tion, but also including less commonly used methods such as Expected Cross
Entropy (Cai et al., 2008)—interestingly Information Gain is also the most
7Stylometry is the statistical analysis of linguistic style.
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commonly used method for email spam filtering (Guzella & Caminhas, 2009).
On the other hand, Almeida et al.’s (2011) comprehensive empirical study
does not use any feature selection technique as they felt it was unnecessary
due to the short length of SMS messages; their dataset had an average of 14
tokens per message. There is no indication in their work of the size of their
feature set, although they extract over 81,000 tokens from their training set
of 5,574 messages. Due to the sparsity in textual representation it is likely
that the feature space is very large.
A common language-independent pre-processing step performed by a
number of researchers is feature abstraction, where features with infrequently
re-occurring values such as URLs, phone numbers or currency amounts are
replaced by a general feature representing the concept rather than the actual
value (Deng & Peng, 2006; Cai et al., 2008).
3.2. Other Machine Learning approaches
Although supervised learning techniques feature in the majority of re-
cent work in SMS spam filtering there have been other machine learning
approaches investigated. An early centralised spam filtering solution was
suggested by Dixit et al. (2005) where, rather than using the more stan-
dard text classification approaches, the SMS messages were represented as
a character-based vector which was projected into a smaller normalised fea-
ture space and clustered to identify clusters of spam and non spam messages.
New messages are classified based on their distance from the known spam
and non spam clusters. This approach is motivated by the lack of keywords
available for the normal classification algorithms due to the short length of
the SMS messages, but the efficacy of this approach at classifying spam was
not evaluated.
The behaviour of spam senders over time can be indicative of whether a
given message is spam or not. Hu & Yan (2010) add a frequency analysis of
SMS traffic to an existing spam filter with the goal of improving the central
system’s real-time processing speed. By considering the frequency of spam
messages received during different time periods and at different locations,
they focus filtering on specific time periods and locations. Their approach
improves the throughput of the system greatly, but at the cost of a large
decrease in spam detection and a significant rise to 2.5% in the false positive
rate.
Non content-based technologies such as social network analysis have be-
come popular in the email filtering area (Boykin & Roychowdhury, 2005;
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yu Lam & yan Yeung, 2007; Tseng & Chen, 2009). Network analysis ap-
proaches are address-based filtering approaches which aim to predict whether
a sender is a potential spammer or not. This is different from the objective of
the content and collaborative filtering techniques, which is to predict whether
the message itself is spam or not. There is some evidence of the start of the
use of these techniques for SMS filtering. Wang et al. (2010) presented an
interesting solution for point-to-point SMS messages, those sent from one mo-
bile device to another, which combines social network analysis with spectral
analysis of message submission behaviour. They generate a directed graph
from message logs and suggest two kinds of filters, an offline filter and an
online filter. The offline filter uses features from a one-hop social network
that models longer-term sender behaviour while the online filter focuses on
how many receivers a sender has sent to in a given time period which is
extracted from a two-hop social network and combined with temporal spec-
tral analysis of submission behaviour. They suggest that their approaches
can be combined with content-based approaches either serially, where results
of independent filter systems can be combined, or sequentially where the
behaviour-based filter can provide input to the content-based system or vice
versa.
3.3. Spam filtering in other Short Text Classification Domains
There has been other relevant spam classification work recently in related
short text message domains. There is significant evidence of spam in social
networks including instant message spam (aka spim) and twitter spam. Typ-
ically, fake or bot accounts are used to automatically send messages or tweets
that contain links that can be used to gather marketing information or for
more malicious or phishing purposes. It has been recently reported that just
35% of the average Twitter users’ followers are real people8.
Most of the published research into spim or Twitter spam filtering typ-
ically tries to identify the spammer or bot that is generating the messages
rather than actually identify the message as a spam message. A variety
of techniques are used, with most approaches combining two or more tech-
niques, generally including blacklisting or blocking. The characteristics used
to identify spam are usually based on the behaviour of the user because the
expectation is that bots will behave in a significantly different manner to hu-
8http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/how-much-of-twitter-is-spam
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man users. Twitter offers additional challenges as a number of twitter users
follow but do not tweet themselves, which can give them a behaviour profile
like spammers8. Due to the emphasis on the identification of the bot user
network analysis approaches are also popular in these domains where the
node in the network represents the user in the social network and the edges
represent friends or followers of the user (Yardi et al., 2010; Wang, 2010; Gao
et al., 2010).
Supervised learning algorithms are used in these domains but there is very
little work that uses the actual textual content of the message. User-based
properties such as the number of social network friends or Twitter followers
or followees (Yardi et al., 2010; Benevenuto et al., 2010; Gianvecchio et al.,
2008; Wang, 2010; Stringhini et al., 2010) or the posting behaviour (Chu
et al., 2010; Castillo et al., 2011) are common. Also popular are features
based on the characteristic elements of such domains such as the number
of hashtags, mentions (uses of other usernames – ‘@username’) and urls in
a message (Wang, 2010; Benevenuto et al., 2010; Stringhini et al., 2010),
or message characteristics such as number of resends/retweets (Benevenuto
et al., 2010).
Gianvecchio et al. (2008) do use the textual message content in a super-
vised learning component which is proposed as one element in an ensemble
approach to spim filtering. This component uses a Naive Bayes classifier with
orthogonal sparse bigrams of words as the message representation. This so-
lution is also adopted by Chu et al. (2010) for Twitter spam filtering. Liu
et al. (2005) also investigate using a Naive Bayes classifier with standard word
tokenisation for spim filtering but report this approach as not effective pos-
sibly due to the short length of the messages. Decision trees (Castillo et al.,
2011; Maaroof, 2010), SVMs (Benevenuto et al., 2010) and random forests
(Stringhini et al., 2010) have been shown to be effective in these short text
domains but always using the more typical user or message-based properties
as features rather than the actual textual content.
The datasets used are collected and labelled by the researchers individu-
ally and to date there are no benchmark results or public datasets available
from this research.
4. SMS spam data
Any supervised machine learning approach such as those mentioned above
is very dependent on the quality and quantity of the training data which is
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available to it. Good spam filtering using text classification methods needs
to have representative, accurate, timely corpora of spam and non-spam mes-
sages with which to train the algorithms. In the email world, a number of
different corpora are available, including the SpamAssassin corpus9 or the
TREC email corpora10. Table 2 in Guzella & Caminhas (2009) gives a good
overview of the benchmark email spam datasets available and the number of
works that have used them.
For SMS spam filtering however, there are few corpora available to-date
which would allow independent corroboration of research results. This is
understandable for a number of reasons. SMS, whether spam or non-spam,
passes through proprietary networks run by private companies who are reluc-
tant or unable to make their customers’ data available for research purposes.
SMS spam filtering is also in its relative infancy compared to email spam
filtering, so many research projects may not have reached a point where they
can make their data publicly available.
The main method to date of collecting SMS data is to ask mobile users
to contribute text messages voluntarily. This method has been used pri-
marily to collect legitimate SMS text messages for research into linguistic
analysis, producing the ICT corpus11 (Shortis, 2000) which is a collection of
202 messages in British English, the NUS corpus12 (How & Kan, 2005), an
ongoing collection of messages in Singaporean-influenced English which cur-
rently contains 28,268 items, and the SMS4Science corpus13 (Beaufort et al.,
2010; Fairon & Paumier, 2006), the product of a continuing SMS collection
project by universities in French-speaking regions whose current release con-
tains 29,979 messages. A slightly different approach was used by Rafique &
Farooq (2010) to collect legitimate SMS messages for spam research. They
provided software to access the memory at the baseband processor of a mobile
phone and redirect all messages in order to collect them.
There also have been more questionable examples of collecting legitimate
messages such as the manual extraction of the text of SMS messages from a
PhD thesis (Tagg, 2009) where the collected corpus for the PhD work had
not been made directly available (Taufiq et al., 2010).
9http://spamassassin.apache.org/publiccorpus/
10http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/~gvcormac/spam/
11http://www.demo.inty.net/app6.html
12http://wing.comp.nus.edu.sg:8080/SMSCorpus/
13http://www.sms4science.org/
13
SMS spam messages have also been collected by asking for contributions
from mobile users. Researchers at the Indraprastha Institute of Information
Technology in India have collected a dataset of SMS spam using crowdsourc-
ing where students on campus were incentivised to forward unique SMS spam
messages to a SMS server (Yadav et al., 2011). This proved successful, with
4000 spam messages (half of which were unique) being collected in 2 months.
This is an interesting collection of SMS data as it contains cross-lingual ex-
amples, with a large proportion of the messages in the collection containing
both Hindi and English words, and is due to be publicly released.
A quicker method of collecting SMS spam messages has been by scraping
consumer complaint websites such as GrumbleText14 which facilitate the re-
porting of unwanted or possibly fraudulent SMS text messages. This method
of data collection has been popular with a number of researchers (Dixit et al.,
2005; Go´mez Hidalgo et al., 2006; Junaid & Farooq, 2011; Rafique & Farooq,
2010; Almeida et al., 2011).
Recently the SMS Spam Collection has been made publicly available15
(Almeida et al., 2011), which is an extension of a corpus previously compiled
by Go´mez Hidalgo et al. (2006). It consists of 747 spam messages manually
extracted from GrumbleText, 450 non-spam messages taken from Tagg’s PhD
thesis (Tagg, 2009), and finally 4,377 non-spam messages randomly sampled
from the NUS corpus. This is the first benchmark dataset available, however
whether it is a representative corpus of SMS data is somewhat questionable.
While the spam data is in British English and is drawn from a single source,
the non-spam is a combination of data from two very disparate sources.
The NUS data is strongly influenced by Singaporean English, using particles
such as “lor” or “lah” which do not occur in British English. Datasets of
this nature are unlikely to occur naturally. In addition, the distribution of
spam and non-spam in the corpus is totally arbitrary, with 13.4% spam. The
actual distribution of spam can only be found by analysing a full stream of
SMS traffic.
The authors perform a duplicate analysis using word n-grams of length
5 and 6 in order to detect repeated messages introduced by the extension of
their original corpus with new data. However despite this analysis the 747
spam messages include 94 messages which are exact duplicates and a further
14http://www.grumbletext.co.uk/
15http://www.dt.fee.unicamp.br/~tiago/smsspamcollection/
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14 messages which are near duplicates, (i.e. exact matches after whitespace
has been removed). These near duplicates will be, in effect, exact duplicates
if standard bag of words tokenisation is used.
4.1. Collection of an SMS spam corpus
In order to investigate the nature of current SMS spam, we have collected
a corpus of SMS spam messages16 by scraping messages from two public con-
sumer complaints websites: GrumbleText and WhoCallsMe17. GrumbleText
has the advantage that users can report spams by forwarding them to a short-
code, which means that the original form of the message is preserved and no
errors are introduced when messages are retyped. The website marks up
the spam text explicitly, so we were able to extract each one automatically.
Removing duplicates resulted in a corpus of 571 unique spam SMS messages.
Users at the WhoCallsMe website report unsolicited calls and text mes-
sages, which are then indexed by source phone number. There is no require-
ment to include the text of the SMS in the post, but many users do so. We
scraped all entries within the UK mobile prefix space, that is, 075- to 079-.
From these entries we used a positive word list (“sms”, “text”, “txt”, “mes-
sage”, “msg”) and a negative word list (“missed call”, “called me”, “voice”,
“caller”) to find posts which most likely refer to SMS. We then extracted any
strings which were between quotes as candidate SMS text, since users usu-
ally quoted their messages this way. We discarded any candidates of length
less than 10 words (whitespace separated substrings). Finally we inspected
the list of candidates to remove obviously erroneous entries, such as foreign
language text, mismatched quotes, or user-added parentheses, resulting in a
list of 737 items. Because many entries occur more than once we removed
any duplicates based on string comparison after lowercasing and deletion
of whitespace to mitigate user transcription errors, leaving a corpus of 436
messages overall.
We took the following steps to assemble a single corpus from the spam
component of Almeida et al.’s (2011) SMS Spam Collection (hereafter SSC)
together with our two sources. We first removed the 108 duplicate messages
from SSC, leaving 639 unique messages. The union of our two sources con-
tains 1,007 messages, from which we removed three further duplicates. We
16http://www.dit.ie/computing/research/resources/smsdata/
17http://whocallsme.com/
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then removed any message from our data which was already present in the
SSC, again based on string comparison after whitespace removal. There were
290 such messages, all as expected in the GrumbleText part of our corpus.
This left 714 messages, which were added to the 639 SSC messages, resulting
in a data set of 1,353 messages in total which contains no duplicates.
Each message extracted from GrumbleText and WhoCallsMe is stamped
with the date it was reported on, and the corpus covers the period from
late 2003 to the middle of 2010. It can therefore be considered an up-to-
date corpus of SMS spam. In addition, all of the data occurred in the same
linguistic region, since all messages had originally been received by UK mobile
users.
Although we have removed duplicates from the data, many of the non-
matching messages may still be close matches, since SMS spam, like email
spam, is characterised by obfuscation. An example is the following message,
which occurs 41 times in total in the corpus, each time differing only by
phone number, claim number and possibly punctuation:
URGENT! We are trying to contact U. Todays draw shows that you
have won a £800 prize GUARANTEED. Call 09050003966 from land
line. Claim S76. Valid 12hrs only
Similarly the following attack occurs 97 times using slightly different phras-
ings, amounts of money and punctuation. For 17 of these the only difference
is in the four characters which are appended to the end of the message text.
You may be entitled to 6000 pounds compensation for the Accident
you had. To claim for free reply with YES to this msg. To opt out
text stop. VLUJ
This latter example provides evidence of concept drift in SMS spam, in
particular an extension of what is known as word salad in email spam where
random text can be added to the end of the message to make each spam
message different in order to frustrate Bayesian and fingerprinting filters.
4.2. Analysis of an SMS spam corpus
With the goal of analysing and identifying different categories of SMS
spam, we have performed a clustering experiment on the corpus presented in
the previous section. The raw documents were parsed and processed accord-
ing to the standard unigram-based text clustering practices. We employed
a stop-list containing 499 entries to remove common functional words. For
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privacy purposes we also removed all references to phone numbers. We ap-
plied basic frequency-based term selection to remove terms occurring in less
than three documents, and standard log-based TF-IDF to weight individual
terms. This resulted in a vector space model representation of 1,353 messages
using 894 terms.
To cluster the messages, we attempted to divide the data into a flat,
disjoint partition via spectral clustering methods (Ng et al., 2001). We com-
puted a normalised linear kernel matrix on the vector representation of the
data (i.e. cosine similarity), and applied k-way spectral clustering with or-
thogonal initialisation which has previously been shown to be effective on a
number of different types of data (Ng et al., 2001). This algorithm involves
computing the truncated eigenvalue decomposition of the kernel matrix de-
scribed above, and applying k-means in the reduced dimension space. To
produce human-readable labels for clusters, we select the top-ranked terms
in the centroid vectors of the clusters when projected back to the original
space, as proposed by Dhillon & Modha (2001).
We experimented with a range of values for the number of clusters k ∈
[5, 15]. Standard internal and stability-based validation methods did not
suggest a specific “correct” value for k. Based on manually inspecting the
cluster labels, we selected k = 10. Values of k < 10 tended to obscure more
specific groups of messages, while values of k > 10 consistently produced
clusters with highly-similar labels, suggesting “over-clustering”.
Table 1 shows the top terms for the clusters identified for k = 10, together
with a set of manually-annotated cluster names based on the top terms. We
can see that a number of distinct clusters are apparent, including groups of
messages pertaining to potential “phishing” financial spam, mobile ringtones,
and dating services.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of messages assigned to each of the cluster
sizes in the full set of 1,353 messages.
We see from Figure 1 that groups of SMS messages pertaining to mo-
bile products (the “ringtones” and “services” clusters) and competitions (the
“competitions” and “prizes” clusters) appear to be most prominent in the
data. To investigate the relations between these clusters, we examine the
similarities of all pairs of clusters based on the cosine similarity between
their centroids.
Figure 2(a) shows a heatmap view of the matrix of pairwise similarities of
the clusters in the original sparse vector space – relatively little similarity is
evident between the groups. When we examine their corresponding similari-
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Annotation Top Terms
Ringtones send, ringtone, text, tone, free, sms, reply, mobile
Claims accident, entitled, records, pounds, claim, msg, compensation,
opt
Competitions txt, win, uk, voucher, cash, 150p, send, entry
Prizes prize, guaranteed, urgent, todays, valid, claim, draw, cash
Voicemail please, message, voicemail, waiting, call, delivery, immediately,
urgent
Dating dating, service, contacted, find, guess, statement, points, pri-
vate
Services mins, video, free, camera, orange, latest, phone, camcorder
Finance help, debt, credit, info, government, loans, solution, bills
Chat naughty, ring, alone, chat, xx, heard, luv, home
Miscellaneous find, secret, admirer, special, looking, r*reveal, contact, call
Table 1: Ten clusters produced by applying spectral clustering to the SMS message dataset,
with their associated top 8 terms and a putative annotation. Clusters are listed in de-
scending order of size.
ties in the low-dimensional embedded spectral space used for clustering (see
Figure 2(b)), as we might expect, we see a greater degree of similarity. This
is particularly the case for the large “ringtones” and “competitions” clusters,
though we also see a relatively high level similarity between the “ringtones”
and “services” clusters, which is perhaps unsurprising. In Figure 2(b) we can
also observe a few distinct outlying clusters, such as “claims” and “voice-
mail”, containing messages that are considerably different from those in the
other clusters.
When we compare these clusters to the types of spam identified by the
GSMA (GSMA, 2011b), we find a close correspondence to the three main
types which are described as,
(i) SMS spam, where unsolicited text messages are sent to subscribers for
mass advertising and social engineering viral hoaxes;
(ii) premium rate fraud which is sending unsolicited text messages that
trick subscribers into calling premium rate numbers or signing up for
subscription services that are charged to their bill and
(iii) phishing/smishing which is sending unsolicited text messages asking
subscribers to call certain numbers to extract confidential information,
which is then used for other purposes.
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Figure 1: Distribution of cluster sizes, for ten clusters produced by applying spectral
clustering to the SMS message data.
The most common type in our dataset is premium rate fraud, which in-
cludes the clusters claims, prizes, voicemail, dating, and chat, and accounts
for 43.9% of the messages. The ringtones and competitions clusters can be
categorised as SMS spam and account for 32.4% of the messages whereas
phishing attacks, which correspond to the services and finance clusters, ac-
count for 13.0% of the messages. Considering the reported rise in phishing
and smishing attacks in recent times18 this is a relatively low figure.
The data also includes instances of Value Added Service Provider (VASP)
abuse which is unsolicited messages sent to subscribers from services providers
for marketing purposes but not in sufficient volumes to be reflected in this
clustering experiment. VASP abuse is also identified by the GSMA as a
distinct type of SMS spam.
18http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/november/cyber_112410/cyber_
112410, http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/
11244_Online_Fraud_report_0111.pdf
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(a) Original vector space
(b) Embedded space
Figure 2: Heatmap of pairwise cluster similarities calculated in (a) the original vector
space, (b) the space constructed from a 10-dimensional spectral embedding of the original
vector space. In both cases, a darker colour is indicative of a higher degree of similarity.
20
Cluster name Size Spam recall (%)
Ringtones 237 91.1
Claims 207 97.5
Competitions 202 96.0
Prizes 171 99.4
Voicemail 128 96.9
Dating 123 97.6
Services 102 97.1
Finance 74 98.7
Chat 65 87.7
Miscellaneous 44 95.5
Table 2: Size and spam recall results for each cluster.
We have generated a number of baseline results by applying state-of-the-
art techniques to our corpus. Using LibSVM (Chang & Lin, 2011) we have
implemented the linear support vector machine and alphanumeric tokenisa-
tion which was found by Almeida et al. (2011) to achieve the best perfor-
mance on their corpus. We intentionally do not include any non-spam data in
our corpus because of the issues outlined above about spam distribution and
linguistic regions. For the purposes of these benchmarks however we have
combined our spam data with 652 unique non-spam messages — taken from
Taufiq et al. (2010) and Shortis (2000) — to create a dataset of British En-
glish SMS. We took these two non-spam sources and combined them with ten
random subsamples of the spam corpus, resulting in ten balanced datasets
of 1304 messages. Ten-fold cross validation on this data resulted in a mean
accuracy of 94.63% (sd=0.6%), a spam recall of 93.31%, and a false posi-
tive rate of 4.05%. The resulting models contain on average 350.8 support
vectors. We have carried out this SVM baseline experiment on a standard
workstation (Linux, 3.16 GHz dual core processor, 4GB RAM), and find that
we can classify messages continuously in under 2 ms per message.
We also examined such a model’s performance in terms of spam recall in
each of the individual clusters. For this we constructed a data set containing
all 1,353 spam messages and the 652 non-spam messages as above. We per-
formed a single run of ten-fold cross validation and partitioned the results
according to cluster membership, which are summarised in Table 2.
The results show that in seven of the nine clusters other than miscella-
neous, 96% or more of the messages are correctly categorised as spam, with
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a detection rate of as high as 99.4% for the prizes cluster. The two remaining
clusters, ringtones and chat, have considerably lower spam recall but are the
largest and smallest cluster, respectively, suggesting that the poorer perfor-
mance is not just due to a smaller number of training instances. In Section 4.1
we discussed near-duplicate messages, citing frequently-occurring examples
from the prize and claims clusters. Clusters which contain multiple occur-
rences of the same spam attack define a tighter, more homogeneous concept,
and therefore a classifier will find these clusters easier to predict correctly.
This is reflected in the results in Table 2, where claims and prizes are among
the best-performing categories. The lower recall rate for the ringtones cluster
may be due to it being a more diverse category.
As a final baseline result we implemented the collaborative filtering ap-
proach proposed by Liu & Fang (2008) for email and applied it to our SMS
data. In this approach a unique fingerprint can be computed from the text
of a message. The fingerprint of each new message is compared to the fin-
gerprints of all known spam SMS, and if it is similar to any spam message
fingerprint then the message is considered spam. Using ten randomised runs
of ten-fold cross validation as described above, this method achieves on av-
erage 79.09% accuracy, 58.24% spam recall and 0.06% false positives.
5. Discussion
This paper has presented the state of the art in SMS spam filtering and
has reviewed a number of different approaches to the problem which have
been suggested and tested. Using different data sets, various researchers
have shown that supervised learning algorithms can be effective for SMS
spam classification, with reported accuracies of up to 97%. There is also
some evidence of the use of non content-based approaches such as social
network analysis and the identification of patterns of SMS submission.
To date, many of the proposed approaches are centrally based but as an
alternative to server-side classifiers, SMS filtering on the client device has the
potential benefit of being independent of the network and the operator’s spam
policy, and can filter based on the user’s personal concept of what is spam.
It does however introduce additional technical restrictions such as available
processing power and the need for a programmable device. Combinations of
server-side and client-side filtering are also possible.
Like with any machine learning task, feature engineering is key, and this
is especially true of SMS filtering because there is less content material in
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the source than in other text classification tasks. Feature selection has also
been highlighted by many researchers due to the high dimensionality of the
feature space.
We motivated the issue of SMS spam mainly in relation to its poten-
tial damaging impact on consumers and mobile networks. This raises the
question of what the requirements of an SMS spam solution should be. The
research reviewed here is evaluated using scientific metrics such as accuracy,
F-score and false positive rate. In addition to these, any complete SMS
spam solution must consider the requirements of an industrial-strength ap-
plication. Speed of processing for instance is crucial, as SMS has become a de
facto real-time, dependable service for applications such as online banking,
and research into client-side filtering identifies processing time as an impor-
tant constraint. Simple solutions such as blacklisting and spoofing/faking
detection are currently being deployed, however these are by their nature
brittle, do not take the content of the message into account, and require
ongoing management. Content-based solutions such as those reviewed here
have the potential to be more accurate and flexible.
The results of the work published to date indicate that there is as yet no
consensus on what the best techniques are for SMS spam filtering. Overall,
the techniques which have been used to date are quite straightforward, ap-
plying what has been used in text classification in general to SMS filtering,
and not necessarily taking the specific characteristics of SMS into account.
One reason for this is simply the relative infancy of the field. Only recently
have the ubiquity of SMS and the falling cost of delivery attracted the inter-
est of spammers, so there has not yet been much time for academic research
to identify and define the problem. A more important reason for the lack of
consensus is that it is hard to compare and contrast research done on radi-
cally different datasets. These datasets vary greatly within the work reviewed
here: by language, where English and Chinese dominate, by size, from a few
hundred instances to a few thousand, and by method of collection. The dis-
tribution of categories also varies, from even numbers of spam and non-spam
to arbitrarily chosen small proportions of spam.
Two methods of data collection have provided the data sets for research
on SMS spam filtering. Harvesting data from online, user-driven sources is
fast, but the available data is limited. For instance a number of researchers
have duplicated the work of scraping SMS data from the GrumbleText web-
site. This method potentially results in an unrepresentative sample, as only
some users feel motivated to report the spam they have received. Eliciting
23
voluntary contributions from users is a more time- and resource-intensive
method of data collection, but can result in larger data sets. Whether this
method results in a more representative sample though is questionable. Con-
sider, for example, the SMS4Science non-spam data collection in Switzerland,
although 23,988 SMS were collected, 80 people donated more than 50 mes-
sages each, and one person even donated 413 messages. One notable success
here is the work of Yadav et al. (2011), who have collected 2,000 unique spam
SMS in the space of two months.
The difficulty and expense of collection spam collection means that the
work reviewed here is based on data sets whose size is in the order of a few
thousand instances at best. This compares poorly to other work in the field of
text classification in general, where corpora containing millions of documents
are available, for instance the Enron email data set of 1.5m emails (Klimt &
Yang, 2004) or the New York Times Annotated Corpus, which contains 1.8m
news articles (Sandhaus, 2008). It may not be possible to make SMS data
freely available if it has been collected in collaboration with an industrial
partner, as there are often strict privacy restrictions.
In own our work we have taken the first approach to data collection, and
have assembled a corpus of 1,353 unique SMS spam messages from a number
of online sources. It represents a larger sample of the same kinds of SMS as
have been used in research on English language SMS spam which is reviewed
here. In our analysis we examined the types of spam using content-based
clustering, identifying ten clearly-defined clusters. This may reflect the extent
of near-repetition in our data caused by the similarity between different spam
attacks and the breadth of obfuscation used by spammers. In terms of the
topics covered by the spam data, it shows that SMS is providing an additional
channel for modern email-based attacks such as phishing, advertising and
premium rate fraud.
In terms of sophistication however, SMS spam is comparable to early
email spam. It is not personalised, obfuscation is limited and little effort is
made to hide the true content of the message. This is of course in part due
to the text-only nature of SMS.
Data may well be expensive to collect, but it seems that it is easier in
regions where there is more spam in the wild. The largest data sets in the
literature have been collected by researchers working in India and China, two
countries where the incidence of spam is highest. This indicates that spam
must reach a certain level before it can be reliably collected, and that this
level may not yet have been reached in English-speaking regions.
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Despite the undoubted initial progress already made on this difficult prob-
lem, we can identify a number of challenges and directions which are apparent
now and which will become more important as the sophistication of spam
increases and as the need for anti-spam solutions leads to more real-world
deployments.
Multilingual environments. Mobile networks are language independent and,
especially in multiple-language regions, they handle SMS in a mixture of
languages. However, all of the research on SMS spam filtering up to now has
used single-language data sets, and the use of word tokenisation introduces
an intrinsic restriction to the language portability of filtering solutions. Due
to the short length of the message content and the lack of clear identifying
information in the headers it can be difficult to identify the language of a
particular message. Robustness in multilingual environments will be a key
requirement of deployed spam filters.
Shared data. Research will benefit greatly if there is a common spam SMS
data set which is representative and sufficiently large. We have seen that
collection of such a data set is possible for non-spam, and the publication
of spam corpora will hopefully lead to alignment on a shared data resource.
Such a development has already been beneficial for researchers on email spam
filtering with the publication of the TREC corpora and the associated eva-
lution toolkit, and it would make research results more readily interpretable
and repeatable.
Hybrid solutions. With spam filtering there is no single solution that works.
It is likely that some types of SMS spam can be better filtered by certain
methods, so similar to the email domain, we see hybrid solutions as a promis-
ing avenue. Given that SMS filtering must happen under very strict process-
ing time restrictions, content-based and collaborative filters could be use-
fully augmented with simple, less resource-intensive filtering methods such
as blacklisting or traffic profiling.
Advanced address-based filtering. The move in recent times in email spam fil-
tering has been towards advanced address-based filtering approaches includ-
ing social network analysis and reputation-based filtering. These techniques
should be considered in the mobile domain also but the lack of adequate data
will hamper such efforts.
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Scalability and real-world deployment. The work reviewed here represents
research prototypes and solutions prepared under controlled laboratory con-
ditions. Our benchmark implementation, which classifies messages in under
2 ms on average, is within the requirements for a system handling real-life
SMS traffic volumes in terms of messages per second per node. This indicates
that a filter based on support vector machines may be a feasible solution.
For any real-world deployment however, the issues of scale and robustness
become crucial, and high-speed databases, clustering, as well as efficient data
structures and implementations will be required.
Industry collaboration. Progress in this field will have to be validated by real-
world trial deployments, which only the network operators can facilitate. As
volumes of spam increase, the promise of content-based filtering should make
such collaboration attractive to industry.
We also see a number of positives in the current state of research, and
much potential for further advances. Overall there are many candidate tech-
nologies and many competing solutions, and the best solution may well turn
out to be a combination of these.
The state of mobile handset technology means that SMS spam filtering
will continue to be needed. Smartphones represent an ever growing segment
of the handset market, and in this segment it is likely that messaging tech-
nology will converge, unifying SMS, email and other message types. However
non-smartphones (known as “feature” phones) are still the majority, and they
continue to be launched in developing markets, for instance in Kenya (Maina,
2010). Feature phones do not have the functionality to support user interac-
tion in the spam filtering process. They do not have separate spam inboxes
and they can not run third-party spam filtering software. This means that
centralised SMS spam filtering will continue to be in demand as the volume
of mobile spam increases.
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